

ÆGIS



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1. Asset Location and Due Diligence — Checking sources on what you say and read

We have, of late, read several opinion pieces that make use of historical references. As with all opinion pieces, these they are pushing some particular agenda or view. This is why they are opinion pieces, not news.

We tend to look at supportive quotes that seem too good to be true, or too convenient, and try to find the original quote. Sometimes the quote is, in fact, real. All too often, however, we find that the quote is not real.

While there is no hard and fast rule as to what should be tested, things tend to get a little out of hand when people are trying to justify their positions in controversial issues. This means that even if a quote supports your personal point of view, it is probably a good idea to check the source and make sure that it is a real quote, and that it is a full quote, or at least a quote taken in context. Thus, for example, while it is in theory accurate to quote Winston Churchill as saying “democracy is the worst form of government,” the impression given is quite different from quoting the whole line, which says “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

More annoying than quotes taken out of context are fake quotes. We have seen quotes supportive of gun ownership attributed to George Washington that, even without checking sources, were simply not the sort of thing that Washington – or anyone else of that era – would have said using those words. We have, by the same token, read quotes attributed to Washington regarding his personal relationship with Christianity. These, too, don’t even need to be checked, as Washington assiduously sidestepped any such comments. We have seen quotes attributed to the Qur'an that were patently false, and as easy to check as are quotes from the Old or New Testament.

The bottom line is that many are willing to add quotes supporting their positions, and may well not bother to check the historicity of favorable quotes. You, on the other hand, have the option of checking anything you hear, and finding out whether what is said is reflective of any actual reality.

Along much the same lines, the Internet is filled with unverified information, and a huge amount of that information is simply wrong. When you get an e-mail telling you something that sounds odd, or read something on-line that

sounds odd, check it out. Sites like <http://hoaxbusters.org/>, <http://www.snopes.com/>, and the Department of Energy's <http://hoaxbusters.ciac.org/> are good places to start.

Why do we care about the accuracy of what we read, particularly if it enforces our own beliefs? We care because we tend to make decisions based on the knowledge available to us, and a belief about the consequences of those actions. While this is, in fact, the best we can do, there are two very obvious problems.

The first is that sometimes our knowledge is wrong or incomplete, or, as noted above, based on patently false information, which means our decisions are likely to be bad ones.

The second is that the consequences of decisions that follow on bad information may not be what we expect, or that what we do seems reasonable, but, in retrospect will turn out not to have been so.

We thought of this last point while reading a recent article on the cause of the drop in crime in New York City (and elsewhere) during the 1990s.

The Giuliani administration based certain policy and actions on James Q. Wilson's theory – and Professor Wilson had emphasized that it was a theory – that if you stopped small problems the big ones would go away. Thus, if you repaired broken windows, and eliminated petty quality-of-life crimes, like windshield washers approaching your car at red lights, larger issues would disappear. This theory was the philosophical basis for the City's emphasis on community policing.

This was in line with the commonly held view that the drop in crime was attributable to:

- The Strong Economy of the 1990s
- Changing Demographics
- Better Policing Strategies
- Gun control laws
- Laws Allowing the Carrying of Concealed Weapons
- Increased Use of Capital Punishment

This view has been challenged by Steven D. Levitt, the Alvin H. Baum Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, and Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, both in Chicago, Illinois in a paper entitled *Why*

Crime Fell (<http://home.law.uiuc.edu/~pjkeenan/documents/Levitt-Why%20Crime%20Fell.pdf>). Levitt posits that crime fell because of:

- Increases in the Number of Police
- The Rising Prison Population
- The Receding Crack Epidemic
- The Legalization of Abortion

Levitt's position was discussed by columnist John Tierney in his opinion piece, *The Miracle That Wasn't*, of 16 April 2004 in the New York Times (<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/16/opinion/16tierney.html>). In recounting a debate between Levitt (author of *Freakonomics*) and Malcolm Gladwell, author of *Blink* and *The Tipping Point*, Tierney notes that Mr. Gladwell, in presenting his rebuttal of Professor Levitt's position, began by jokingly saying, "My first inclination is to say that everything you just heard from Steven Levitt, even though it contradicts things I have written, is true."

We don't know whether Professor Levitt's view is, in fact, true. Indeed, we are not entirely sure what "true" means in social policy issues. As an example of our confusion, it is fairly clear that any investing strategy in a long-term bull market is a good one. But that doesn't mean the strategy is, in and of itself, good. It is also clear that, if you sacrifice a virgin each year on the Winter solstice, the days will start getting longer again, as has always happened after such a sacrifice. But we are not convinced this is either causal or the best long-term use of a potentially-contributive pre-pubertal male.

The best we can do is try various approaches to dealing with problems, even looking at theories as uncomfortable as Levitt's, and see if they really make a difference. If not, we should back out of what we were doing, and try something else. And if something seems to be working, we should still look at it from time to time to see if it really *is* working, or if the *propter hoc* is merely *post hoc*.

2. OPSEC, Economic Espionage, and Competitive Intelligence — OPSEC: Don't be fooled by the name

A major marketing problem with OPSEC lies in its full name: OPSEC is an acronym for **OP**erations **SEC**urity. While OPSEC is no more related to what security professionals do than is Social Security, the mere inclusion of the word *security* condemns any area to being ignored by many.

In the case of OPSEC this confusion is neither a big surprise nor unreasonable, because Operation **S** Security is easily confused with Operation **AL** Security, which is, in fact, all the **rule-based** stuff done by security professionals.

OPSEC (we won't here discuss Social Security, which is already much in the news), on the other hand, is a **threat-based** (not rule-based) *process* allowing us to put in place internal controls in the private sector that use risk analysis based on specific threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, to reduce vulnerabilities to (and therefore derived risk from) competitive intelligence, economic espionage, and theft of information.

Further confusing this issue is the fact that OPSEC, like Social Security, sometimes does require intervention on the part of security professionals. Thus, for example, a lot of what we know about dealing with check theft and fraud come from our experiences with Social Security. And many of the protective measures that have been put in place to deal with check theft and fraud came from Social Security. Nonetheless, we think of Social Security more as an administrative/financial/accounting system than something to be run by Homeland Security (though the folks at DHS probably are eyeing it).

Similarly, OPSEC *may* add security measures to the list of actions being taken. These security measures generally relate to things that not have been thought of as important before the OPSEC analysis (they are measures designed to counter specific vulnerabilities based on specific adversaries, and therefore reduce mission risk). Largely, however, OPSEC is more likely to generate countermeasures and internal controls that are invisible from a security perspective. They may, for example, be revealed in operational activities themselves (how or when an action is performed), or generated through the plans or management function, and therefore not fall into the category of a security measure.

Thus, it is no surprise that when Sarbanes-Oxley required internal controls dealing with the OPSEC function, management would turn to the CFO to handle these, rather than the director of security, as they probably would if OPSEC were not more commonly known by its acronym.

3. Executive Protection — Self-protection leading to arrest

Recently a friend of ours, a man of 74 years, came back from a trip to Europe. He lives with his wife on the top floor of an apartment building, in a wing that is pretty empty: One apartment is empty, one apartment is being

renovated, and one apartment is occupied by a flight attendant who is usually somewhere else.

Since before his trip, he and his wife have had a problem with people being on the building's roof at night, making a lot of noise. When people have come down from the roof, and he has asked them to be quiet, he has been insulted and, in some cases, threatened. The building super said that when people are on the roof our friend should call the front desk, which will, in turn, call the super.

On this particular evening, still somewhat jet-lagged, they heard people on the roof, and he called the front desk to ask them to find the super (who never responded). He eventually heard the people come down from the roof, and opened his door to see a man with two children. He asked the man, as usual, to be quiet. The man said, "Nobody tells me what the fuck to do," and continued down the hall. Our guy, not thinking clearly, was afraid the man might not leave the floor, so he went to his closet and got a tree-pruning tool – the first thing he came upon in his closet – that he held by his side as he went into the hall to make sure the man left.

The man, in fact, got into the elevator with his children, and pointed at him, saying, "I'll be back for you. I'll get you." Our guy went back in and called the police. A while later the police showed up and arrested our friend, dragging him off in handcuffs.

At the very best this will be a costly and frightening experience for him and his wife. At worst, it will be much more than that. In retrospect, he wishes he had not opened the door after he called the super.

The problem, of course, is that we all have the nagging belief that we ought to be entitled to do something when bullies kick sand in our face. While this is admirable, there are a lot of constraints on your options if you are not the bad guy, unless you are a cop or willing to face criminal prosecution. Most jurisdictions have very strong views that only the police should be able to protect you from violence. Indeed, some have posited that the reason the passengers who fought-back on Flight 93 did not receive posthumous honors was because it was felt this would encourage a repeat of that sort of vigilante justice, rather than leaving these situations to trained professionals.

This being the reality, what should you do when you, or some other person, are threatened, but not actually facing danger of injury, death, or great bodily harm? Walk away, without doing anything confrontational.

Our guy did the right thing in calling the super. He should have called the police when the super didn't come. He should subsequently have asked the building to alarm the entrance to the roof – a very common practice – to discourage people from going to an area where there should be no access. We suspect that a few calls by the building to the police when the alarm was set off would soon discourage recreational use of this prohibited area.

Certainly in a situation where no serious danger was faced, he should not have grabbed a tree trimmer, a device that is not considered an acceptable emergency safety tool used by nice people. And while letting a potential-attacker see the pruning hook to discourage an attack may have seemed reasonable to our friend's jet-lagged brain, closing the door would have been a better choice in this jurisdiction.

And don't worry about looking like a sissy. Someone known to us came home from a trip some years ago to discover that his front door was unlocked (it later turned out his roommate simply forgot to lock it when she went out). As chance would have it, he was wearing a ballistic vest, had a gun in his bag, and was trained for house clearing. Did he go in? No! He went back outside, flagged down an RMP, and let the officers go in.

It is also important to note that in the case of unavoidable confrontations there are emergency safety tools that are significantly more socially acceptable than a pruning hook. As an example, even here in New York City it is possible to legally own capsaicin-based personal defense sprays (although most of those sold here in Gotham are actually sold outside the law, which requires paperwork by the *FFL* or *pharmacist* making the sale). A tool that is legally available is always a better choice than one that is not legally acceptable. And it is a lot easier to explain why you were prepared to spray someone than it is to explain why you were prepared to prune (or stab or whack or hack) them.

Finally, note that if you plan to have an emergency safety tool at your disposal it is a good idea to know both when it is appropriate to be used, as well as how to use it effectively. We would strongly urge anyone who thinks they might want to defend themselves to read our book *The Seven Steps to Personal Safety*, which is the leading book on dealing with violence. Although the book is in print and may be purchased – and we encourage you to buy many copies – the next edition is always available, pre-publication, as an Acrobat file, and may be downloaded in its entirety, FREE, at <http://www.lubrinco.com/7steps.pdf>. Reading *The Seven Steps* could help

you avoid a needless confrontation, or successfully survive a confrontation that cannot be avoided.

We hope that none of our readers will ever have to deal with violence. And we hope that none of our readers create a situation where they will be victimized, as was our friend, by not understanding how the game is played.

4. Technical Issues — DR-CAFTA

It looks likely that the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement will pass. This will open up the same kinds of opportunities for some businesses that were opened with NAFTA.

While doing business in Central America and the Dominican Republic may not seem to be quite as sexy as doing business in, say, Russia, the truth is that we in the U.S. do more business with Central America than we do with Russia. In fact, we do more business with Central America than we do with Russia, India, and Indonesia combined! In 2003, U.S. exports to the Dominican Republic were \$4.2 billion, and nearly \$11 billion to the five Central American countries. Plus, Central America is a lot closer than the more exotic venues, which creates both transport and control benefits.

This means that if your business is one that could take advantage of CAFTA, now it the time to start planning your entry into the market. For those who think this might be a good area, consideration should be given to attending the International Industrial Exposition (INDUEXPO 2005), being held in Guatemala City from 1 June to 3 June. Information on the exposition can be found at <http://www.induexpo2005.com/>.

As with any unfamiliar geographical or cultural area, due diligence is a key factor for success. While people soon learn – generally at great cost – the importance of due diligence in an obviously foreign environment, there is still a tendency to assume that in Latin America there is less of a need. We – or anyone who has done business in Latin America without appropriate exercise of due diligence – can assure you that due diligence is absolutely as essential in the Americas as it is in more exotic locales!

So if you want to do business in the DR-CAFTA region, we would urge you to call us before you have trouble, rather than after.

5. Real Stories from the Field — Caribbean BSAR

We at FEEINC were recently retained to perform our *Business Security Audit and Review*SM (BSAR) for an international bank, located in the

Caribbean. The BSAR is a detailed overview of the security position of a business, and covers risks and threats the business may face, and recommends how to manage and mitigate those risks and threats. We surveyed for the bank their functional areas of physical security, financial data security, and personnel.

The bank was drowning in paper. Their conference room was full of papers and file cabinets. The kitchen area was full of computer printouts bound together. The basement was filled with paper. Two makeshift overhead storage areas were filled with paper. The electrical closet was filled with computer paper printouts. Some of the papers were stored overhead in a makeshift 2nd floor. This makeshift floor was deforming under the weight of the papers. In some of the rooms, the paper records physically blocked the fire exits for that side of the building!

The records stored in the basement were piled on the floor and on the a/c ductwork. The records on the floor had been damaged by water and silverfish and the records crushing the ducts were restricting the air flow.

A binder filled with paper shifted, slid to the side, and came to rest on the phone connection board, shorting out half of the telephone lines for the bank. While no permanent damage was done, it cost \$700.00 for the telephone repairman to find and fix this.

The papers were stored in the electrical closet were in danger – imminent danger – of sliding over and landing on a lead / acid battery used for starting the generator that ran the backup power supply. Sulfuric acid on paper can cause it to burn, and the metal binders could easily short the uncover battery terminals and ignite the paper attached to the binders.

They were in Paper-Hell because the bank's internal policy required them to keep paper records, even though they had imaged back-ups, with the imaged back-ups kept both on-site and in a second, off-site location. They had apparently never read the article in AEGIS about records retention policies.

We, however, had, and our recommendation for the bank was to work with the auditors and regulators and come up with a records retention policy they could all live with. It had become a matter of actual safety for the bank and its employees.

The final outcome? Well, they now have to keep only about half of what they were storing. As it turned out, some records required to be kept were those with water damage and chewed on by many generations of silverfish. Fortunately, the bank's imaged documents covered these documents.

The conference room has been reclaimed, the fire exit doors cleared, the power and telephone closets cleared, the makeshift storage was reinforced, and now allows permanent storage for the smaller number of records the bank has decided it must keep.

6. Book and Product Reviews

Defensive Use of Firearms

Stephen P Wenger

Paladin Press ISBN: 978-1-58160-469-6 120 pages \$20.00

<http://www.paladin-press.com/> 1-303-443-7250

Since we discussed a defensive-ish incident earlier in this issue, it seems a good time to talk about *Defensive Use of Firearms*, which was written by someone known to us. It also seemed a good time to discuss our view on use of guns, which will provide a background for the book.

Guns are wildly popular here in the United States. We have more guns than automobiles, more than half of all households have guns in them. Shooting sports are very popular, with more people engaging in shooting sports than in playing tennis. There are 17 Olympic shooting events, and a host of non-Olympic events available to competitors. Shooting sports – particularly handgun competitions – are growing popular among women, largely because shooting is fun, but also because it involves fine-motor skills, and, as a group, women generally have better fine-motor skills than men. Shooting also requires relatively little upper-body strength, and, as a group, women generally have upper-body strength than do men.

Guns are also widely used for self-defense in our more-violent-than-most culture, and we have seen convincing estimates of a defensive use every 13 seconds (in the overwhelming majority of cases, the gun never fired). In general, if a gun is needed for self-defense –that is to say if someone is actively trying to kill you – there exists no other emergency safety tool that will adequately stand in its place.

The downside to guns is, of course, gun homicide and accidental deaths, particularly the tragic accidental gun deaths of children. Astonishingly, these are so rare as not to be much of a statistically realistic concern. In the last year of record, out of 2,437,583 deaths in the U.S, there were a only 10,131 murders and non-negligent homicides involving firearms. There are about a thousand accidental gun deaths a year (mostly, it appears, involving hunters), of which roughly 110 deaths – two per state per year – are tragic

accidental gun deaths of children. This is a figure so low as to not allow amelioration through social policy or law.

From a societal point of view, we believe the benefits of civilian gun ownership compensates for the firearms homicides and accidents. And that there is a benefit to having some number of people carrying guns concealed on their person, as it creates enough uncertainty in the minds of criminals as to cause them to move to property crimes rather than crimes against the person. But it only takes a small number of people owning guns and carrying concealed weapons to induce this uncertainty.

Do we ourselves keep and carry guns for self-protection? No. Do we have our protective people carry them? In general, other than in quasi-military situations, no, as we want agents to feel more like rabbits than lions, and make every effort to anticipate and avoid problems, and to run away from problems if they occur, taking the people under their care with them.

Should *you* own a gun for self-protection? That is a personal choice, and we frankly have no strong feeling about it one way or the other, **assuming that there is no troubled teenager in the house who might be suicidal, or anyone else, for that matter, who might be suicidal, in which case we have a strong feeling against.** While the absence of a gun will not reduce the likelihood of a suicide, it *will* markedly reduce the likelihood of a suicide with your gun!

If you *do* keep a gun for personal protection – if you have made the decision that, in certain circumstances, you would be willing to take the life of another human being – we feel very strongly that you should know how to use the gun responsibly and effectively.

Knowing how to use a gun has two parts. The first part is the general gun safety part and operating mechanics part, for which we think training is the best way to learn. Note that accident rates and rates of misuse of guns do not differ between states that have a mandatory requirement for training and those that do not. What we are looking for is not fulfillment of a meaningless legal requirement, but, rather, for a voluntary commitment to safety on the part of the gun owner who might need to take a life if there is no other option available.

The second part is training in use of the gun, which includes the mechanics of making the gun work effectively for the purpose of protection of life. This last part is the kicker: Training that works for one use may not transfer to another. Thus, we, ourselves, train for Olympic-style competitions, for police-style competitions, and for the kind of shooting one might need in the

work we do professionally. None of the training we do for each of these specialties is necessarily related to the skills needed for the other specialties, and certainly not for defensive use by private citizens.

For those interested in self-defense, you need to build a sure knowledge of when and where you can **and cannot** use an emergency safety tool, as well as to develop both appropriate tactics and strategies that will allow you to survive. And, finally, you need to develop the ability to shoot under stress and actually hit whomever you are aiming at, and not anyone else.

Besides training, you will want to read a lot about self-defense in general and shooting in particular, as is appropriate for a commitment to take the life of another human being. Which brings us to *Defensive Use of Firearms*.

While not written for the beginning shooter, *Defensive Use of Firearms* has been put together by someone who has spent a lot of time studying shooting, and training in shooting, and teaching shooting. It covers a wide variety of subjects, starting with an excellent review of safety issues. For the experienced shooter interested in using a gun for self-defense, it gives another set of options to consider. For those new to defensive shooting, it gives some tips you might not have considered unless you are either well trained or spend a lot of time thinking about unlikely events.

As an example, many shooting classes talk about “double taps,” where you fire two rapid shots at the person you are trying to stop, or triple taps, where you fire two shots to center of mass and a third to the head. This is a good thing to do with a single opponent, as handgun bullets – even big ones – are pretty small, and two hits increase the likelihood of making someone who is trying to kill you stop. **HOWEVER**, if you are facing multiple opponents, double or triple taps are a very bad idea indeed, because by the time you finish with the first or second bad guy, the last in the row might well have shot you. So in this case you need to take one shot at each of your opponents (most people don’t like to be shot at, so this disconcerts them greatly), and when you are finished with the last of them you start back at the beginning.

Assimilating this sort of knowledge is important, because until you do a lot of *when-then* thinking (*when* this happens, *then* I will do that), you are likely to end up in a situation that you have not only not practiced-for, but never even thought about. And when you are in a situation for which you are unprepared, you are likely to do – nothing. This is why people in the business of staying alive when others are likely to try to kill them are always running *when-then* scenarios in their minds, thinking “*When* I am on a train and hear shooting in the next car, *then* I will...” or “*When* I open my front

door and there is a bad guy standing there with a spanner, *then* I will...” or “*When* I pause before entering a store or office and bank, and see everyone frozen in place, *then* I will...” or “*When* I am sitting an a restaurant, squished in among my family on the banquette, and some crazy person bursts in and starts shooting, *then* I will...” or “*When* I am in a parking lot with my precious six year old daughter, and a robber holding a gun bursts out of a store and runs for his car, *then* I will...”

Defensive Use of Firearms is well organized and concise, with seven chapters:

Safety with Firearms (8 pages)
Mental Awareness (4 Pages)
Mental Preparedness (6 pages)
Tactics (19 pages)
Skills (30 pages)
Equipment (22 pages)
Legal Issues (4 pages).

These seven touch on *most* of the areas you need to be thinking about if you contemplate using a gun for self-defense (it is lacking a chapter on how you, the defender, deal with the after-effects of a violent encounter). Each chapter has information of potential value to you, and each chapter will indicate areas in which you need to do additional research and reading.

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